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Abstract 
This paper aims to summarize and make some conclusions from findings of five EU project during the period 2009–2015. In the 
ACCSEAS project (2012–2015) the future accessibility of the North Sea region was investigated from a shipping perspective. The 
EfficienSea project (2009–2012) and the two MONALISA projects (2010–2013, and 2013–2015) investigated Sea Traffic 
Management (STM) as a way to optimize ship traffic that might satisfy safety and efficiency demands as well as the demands for 
lower emissions. The paper will look in detail on the navigational solutions and the user tests that has been done with ship officers, 
pilots and VTS operators. 
The EU commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% to 2050 is another factor acting on the shipping industry. By 
“slow steaming” and just-in-time-arrival, substantial reduction in emissions can be made.  
A surprising finding was the large number of planned offshore windmill installations in the North Sea. Managing a growing number 
of ships in a shrinking sea space will led to issues of who is in control: the master onboard or the central coordination mechanism 
overseeing the whole traffic situation. The task of the mariner risk being reduced to keeping the ship in a time-slot-box, monitoring 
an ever better automation. In addition, slower speeds lead to longer voyages, which risk being less socially attractive. Lack of 
competent seafarers is already today a problem. Finally, the issue of unmanned ships will be considered, the MUNIN project  
(2013–2015), Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks. Even before this project has finished the industry 
has picked up some of these new possibilities and has proposed different solutions for unmanned ships, one of them electrical, with 
zero emission. 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +46-70-668-1819. 
E-mail address: thomas.porathe@ntnu.no 
234   Thomas Porathe /  Transportation Research Procedia  14 ( 2016 )  233 – 242 
© 2016The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Road and Bridge Research Institute (IBDiM). 
Keywords: e-navigation; route exchange; ACCSEAS; MONALISA project; MUNIN; EfficienSea 
1. Introduction 
We must be doing something right as the number of shipping accidents is in steady decline. Since 1997, the 
frequency of total loss as a percentage of the world fleet has more than halved by both the number of vessels and 
tonnage (IMU, 2015). However, accidents do happen. 
1.1. Collisions and groundings 
In the beginning of October 2011 the 225 meters long container vessel Rena was approaching the port of Tauranga 
on the North Island of New Zeeland at about 2 o’clock in the morning. They were in a hurry and needed to reach the 
pilot pick-up point before 3 o’clock, at the very end of the tidal window for the port. On the voyage up to Tauranga, 
the vessel took several short cuts to improve on its arrival time. Also on the final legs towards the pilot pick-up station 
Rena where cutting the voyage plan short. With all systems working and two officers and a lookout on the bridge 
Rena hit the Astrolabe Reef in 17 knots (see Figure 1, left). One may wonder why. There is still only an interims 
report from the Transport Accident Investigation Commission of New Zeeland (TAIC, 2012). 
Similar accidents happens every year. Some of them pass relatively unnoticed; others make the headlines like the 
Costa Concordia, the Exon Valdez or the Torre Canyon in its days. Today ships are equipped with transponders 
regularly sending out their position. Had the Tauranga pilots, or the NZ Coast Guard been looking they could have 
seen that the Rena was heading for danger and sent out a warning. People make mistakes; that is the part of the human 
condition. However, with more eyes watching, the chances of catching them early increases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Fig. 1. Left: The final track of the container vessel Rena. The solid line is the voyage plan and the hatched line is the actual track ending on the 
Astrolabe Reef (Image from TAIC, 2012). Right: The collision between Baltic Ace and Corvus J in the English Channel in 2011. On this screen 
compilation the final minutes has been reconstructed from AIS data (VesselFinder, 2012). 
A dark and windy December evening 2011 in the English Channel the car carrier Baltic Ace collided with the 
container vessel Corvus J. Baltic Ace was underway for Kotka in Finland traveling up the northeast bound traffic 
separation scheme while Corvus J was on a southeasterly course inbound for Rotterdam. The web site VesselFinder 
(2012) made an animated reconstruction of the collision based on AIS positions (see Fig. 1, right). On the 
reconstruction (where the final minute of Baltic Ace maneuvers are missing), it appears that the give-way ship Corvus 
J, is not yielding until very late when Baltic Ace has already started to make an evasive port turn. In the collision that 
followed the car carrier sank within minutes killing 11 of its crewmembers. The accident took place on international 
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waters outside the Dutch coast and both ships were under convenience flag. No accident investigation has so far been 
conducted. Narrative based on Maritime Bulletin (2012). 
“If people only followed regulations, none of this would happen” is a statement frequently heard after an accident. 
However, humans are not machines and again, we have the human factor at the sharp end of an unsafe act. One wonder 
why traffic is not managed in a more active way in the world’s most trafficked strait with more than 144 000 ships 
passing in 2012. Voyage plans resides electronically onboard. By collecting and coordinating them, it is possible to 
detect ahead of time, if two ships is at the same place at the same time. 
1.2. e-Navigation 
The fact is that there is so much more information available today that could be used for the benefit of safety and 
efficiency. The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) is by now mandatory for all larger ships. 
These ships also has to do a voyage plan from port to port. This voyage plan reside electronically in the navigation 
system onboard. At the same time, ships must have an Automatic Identification System (AIS) that transmits their 
position and name. However, information from the voyage plan is not used to avoid close counter situations or to 
monitor navigation errors. 
In 2006, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) started the work on a concept called “e-Navigation” 
defined as the harmonized collection, integration, exchange, presentation and analysis of marine information onboard 
and ashore by electronic means to enhance berth-to-berth navigation and related services for safety and security at 
sea and protection of the marine environment (IMO, 2015). 
Some opportunities brought by this new concept has been investigated in five EU projects that the author has taken 
part in during the years 2009 to 2015. This paper will take a closer look at some of the findings of these projects. 
Predominantly the aspect of safety, but also to some extent efficiency and sustainability of ship operations illustrated 
by the two accidents summarized above. 
2. Prototyping innovative e-Navigation solutions 
In the introduction, the grounding of the container vessel Rena in New Zeeland and the collision between Baltic 
Ace and Corvus J, in the English Channel, both in 2011, was briefly presented. They are examples of unnecessary 
accidents that can be avoided by technology already available today.  
2.1. Ship traffic management 
Every ship leaving port has a plan. At the destination the ship is expected at a certain time and resources are 
allocated, such as tugs, a berthing place, cranes and trucks. Usually the ship will plan for the shortest possible way, as 
bunker cost is one of the main expenses. The voyage plan is then used as a template for the ship’s mates during the 
transit. The voyage plan may need to be adapted during the voyage due to weather or to give way for other ships. 
However, in general the ship is planned to be at a certain spot at a certain time during the whole voyage. We can think 
of this spot as a “moving haven”, a box moving over the chart, the boundaries of the box is some sort of “safety zone” 
within which you do not want to have other ships or reefs. If you keep your ship in the box, the system will take care 
of both separation and under keel clearance. Even if the plan would need to be updated several times during a voyage 
depending on e.g. winds, currents and engine performance the predictability of a vessels whereabouts and arrival to 
destination would be much improved compared with today when there only is an uncertain ETA (Estimated Time of 
Arrival) for the port authorities to rely on. According to the harbormaster of a major Scandinavian port, commercial 
AIS web sites is often used to check that expected vessels really is on track for a planned berthing (personal 
communication). 
The idea of using the already existing ship voyage plans as a starting point for ship traffic management was 
developed in four EU project from 2009 up to present day: 
x The InterReg IVb Baltic Sea project EfficienSea (2009–2012), 
x the 7th framework project MONALISA (Motorways and electronic navigation by intelligence at sea – 
2010-2013), 
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x the InterReg IVb North Sea project ACCSEAS (Accessibility for shipping, efficiency, advantages, and 
sustainability – 2012–2015), and 
x the 7th framework project MONALISA 2.0 (2013–2015). 
This idea was termed route exchange and the objective was to predict ships future positions. 
2.2. A taxonomy of ship routes 
One might think of a ship’s voyage ahead in time as consisting of different parts: first, there is the whole voyage. 
This voyage plan can be made many months ahead and must be in place before the ship can leave port. We may call 
this the ship’s strategic route (see Figure 2). Once the ship is underway with the strategic route uploaded in the 
navigation system, the short-term predictions (10–90 minutes ahead) will be very accurate. This short-term prediction 
may be called the tactical route and can be transmitted though the ship’s AIS (or the like) to other ships in the vicinity. 
We also have the familiar very short term predictions (maybe 0–3 minutes ahead) given by the ships inertia though 
speed and rate of turn that many systems already today use as the “course-speed vector” in radar and ECDIS displays. 
 
Fig. 2. A suggested taxonomy for ship routes (inspired by Jan Hendrik Oltmann, WSV). 
2.3. Strategic route exchange 
The strategic route coordination process was investigated in the two MONLISA projects. It can simplified be 
explained as follows (see Figure 3): The ship makes the voyage plan in port, just as today. (1) The route is then 
electronically sent to a coordination center (2). In the center, the route is automatically checked for under keel 
clearance, separation to other ships, violations of NoGo areas, etc. During this time, the route is marked as “pending” 
on the chart display onboard (3). Next, one of two things can happen: The coordination center “recommends” the 
route immediately (5), or it suggests some changes to the route, and sends a new route suggestion where the “not 
recommended” part is in red and the new suggestion is in dashed green (4). There can then be a negotiation back and 
forward until there an agreed “recommended route” dashed in green (5). The ship finally confirms to the route and it 
becomes an “agreed”, coordinated route with a green backdrop (6). (Porathe, Lutzhoft, et al., 2013). During the 
voyage, the “agreed” rout may need to be updated, but there is always a green route for the traffic coordination. 
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Fig. 3. Route exchange process between ship and the traffic coordination center (Porathe, Lutzhoft, et al., 2013). 
Strategic routes are not openly shared and only the coordination center can see all ships’ strategic routes. Strategic 
routes can be planned years ahead as e.g. in the case of ferry companies. There will be priority issues here as well as 
there is with landing and start slots in the aviation industry. However, these could be solved in a similar way. 
 
2.4. A “moving haven” 
The ships planned position in the chart can be visualized as a box with a certain width and length. Within the box, 
the ship is on route, and on time. The width of the box can be set to a distance that will conveniently give the ship 
room for evasive maneuvers on the high seas, while in confined waters, the cross-track distance will be smaller and 
navigation will need to be more closely monitored. The length of the box will depend on the time precision required. 
However, for traffic separation purposes the length should not be too long.  
In the case, a ship leaves its box there will be an alarm onboard and ashore. In the case of Rena, above, the pilots 
waiting further ahead would be notified and could call out a warning that they were steaming towards danger. In the 
case of the Baltic Ace, Corvus J collision, the traffic coordination center would have detected in advance that two 
boxes were to be at the same place at the same time. 
In confined areas with high traffic density one might even envision a “conveyer belt” of slots moving in a pre-
-planned manner and ships entering the area would have to catch an empty slot much like landing and starting slots 
on an airport. One such area with high traffic density will be the future southern North Sea between UK and Holland. 
Figure 4 shows a composite image derived in the ACCSEAS project. To the left is the English coast at Kent and to 
the right Den Haag in Holland. Traffic density plots has been added as darker lines over the sea area. From southwest 
to northeast are the major traffic through and from the English Channel. The northwest – southeast traffic pattern is 
the ships between Humber and the English east coast and Rotterdam. The orange areas is present and future windmill 
parks. Very few are jet built, but the image show the present planning status of the area (4coffshore, 2015).  
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Fig. 4. The planned future state of the southern North Sea based on data from the wind energy web site 4coffshore.com (2015). 
2.5. Tactical route exchange 
The tactical route exchange was investigated in the EfficenSea and the ACCSEAS projects. This intended route 
process is different and much simpler than the strategic route coordination, which involves a traffic coordination 
center. In the tactical case, a number of waypoints ahead of the ship’s present position is transmitted though AIS to 
all ships within radio range. A ship can see other ships’ intended routes by right clicking on a ship’s AIS symbol in 
the electronic chart and select “show intended route”, see Fig. 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. A ship’s intended (tactical) route is displayed by right clicking on the AIS symbol and selecting “Show intended route”. In this case the 
Own Ship (to the right) can see that the intention of the right-of-way ship on its starboard side. It will see that the intention is not to cross in front, 
but to turn to a parallel course in the same lane. 
3. Testing with users for professional acceptance 
The concept presented above was tested with prototypes in different iterations during the years 2012–2014. The 
first study on the tactical route exchange was conducted at the Simulator center at Chalmers University in 2012. The 
scenario was a passage through the Sound between Sweden and Denmark with two vessels, one passing from south 
to north, and one from north to south. The focus of this study was the tactical route exchange ship-to-ship. This study 
is described in detail in Porathe, de Vries, et al. (2013).  
The second study was conducted at Chalmers in 2013. The focus this time was the strategic route exchange ship-
-to-shore and shore-to-ship. The scenario was a ship entering a coordination area sending its voyage plan to the 
coordination center, and negotiating a green route. Later the route is changed, first initiated by the ship due to weather, 
and later by the shore due to port delays, and then drifting timber. Details of this study is published in Porathe, de 
Vries, et al. (2013). 
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The last scenario was then repeated onboard two Korean training vessels in a Korean archipelago context in April 
2014. Details of this study is presented in Porathe, Borup, et al. (2014). 
A final study – again focusing on the tactical route exchange – was conducted in the Simulator Centre at Chalmers 
in October 2014. The environment was the Humber Estuary in the UK and the approach to the ports of Immingham 
and Hull, with high traffic density and congestion. Details of this study are published in Porathe and Brodje (2015). 
The participants in all these studies has been professional bridge officers and pilots with long experience and cadets 
and in relevant cases, pilots and VTS operators with experience from the areas simulated. The lengths of the scenarios 
has often been several hours why the number of participants has been in the range of 10–20 for each study.  
Qualitative data was collected by video during the simulations where the participants were encouraged to think 
aloud and comment on their experience. 
3.1. Results 
Detailed results has been presented in the papers referred to above and this paper will only give an overview of the 
findings from the four projects mentioned. 
The findings from the prototype tests with strategic route exchange in the two MONALISA projects were generally 
positive. They showed good professional acceptance as scored on a “professional acceptance rating.” 
Findings from the prototype tests with the intended route feature in the EfficienSea and ACCSEAS projects 
suggests that it serves its purpose well. Early concerns raised regarding possible risks if ships did not follow their 
intended routes (e.g. in case of an overtaking) was revoked in the later study (Humber Estuary). Experienced officers 
and pilots considered it beneficial to know other ships intentions even if they deviated from them. The reason was that 
if was considered easy to see the reason for a deviation. The professional acceptance rating used in the last studies 
showed good acceptance scores.  
Most participants, both younger and older were more or less positive to the ship traffic management concept. 
Having said that, there was discussion on the yet undecided scope of the proposed route exchange system and the role 
of the new coordination centre; would it be monitoring, advisory, assistance, or full control? Would it become 
a challenge to the ultimate authority of the captain? Where would responsibility and liability lie for delays, costs 
incurred, accidents etc.? Several participants expressed the likelihood of conflict between the coordination centre and 
vessel on the issue of control and the coordination centre and ship-owners on the issue of costs. All participants agreed 
that the final decision needed to stay with the captain onboard. 
4. The navigating navigator or the monitoring navigator 
If we stop for a minute and reflect on the systems developed in the projects discussed above, we might see two 
things: first, we have the potential of a system creating a safer traffic situation. Secondly, automatic monitoring 
together with automatic track keeping capabilities will lead to a situation where the bridgework is increasingly reduced 
to monitoring more and more reliable automation. 
This brings us to the discussion about the “navigating navigator” versus the “monitoring navigator.” No doubt 
“deskilling” is a problem that follows with automated systems in all occupations. The use of satellite positioning 
systems has led to mariners losing proficiency in the use of sextant and sight reduction tables, although the method is 
stilt taught at maritime colleges. The use of advanced traffic management systems where the mariner’s task is reduced 
to keep his ship within a moving box will risk that mariners become less proficient in many tasks that belong to active 
navigation. However, IMO’s Sub-Committee on Radio Communications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR) in 2011 
decided that the navigator should be kept in the loop as a “navigating navigator” (IMO, 2011). 
Automation and technical robustness is the reason for the decline in ship accidents that was mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper. An important task for developers will be to ensure that modern technology is used for safety 
improvement while still keeping the navigator in the loop, practicing skills that allow him or her to step in and perform 
professionally for the rare situation that automation fails. 
There seems to be two directions: Either we find a way of reversing the roles on the bridge. Letting the navigator 
go back to more or less manual navigation, with skills intact, and always in the loop; or we remove the onboard 
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navigator and let the ship navigate autonomously, monitored, and sometimes remotely controlled, by an operator 
ashore.  
5. Towards unmanned ships? 
We will touch on one final project here: Maritime Unmanned Navigation through Intelligence in Networks, 
MUNIN (2013–2015). The reasons for investigating unmanned ship are many: cost reductions, safety gains, but maybe 
most importantly, decreasing emissions. The European Commission has committed to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. For such a vast undertaking, all parts of the society needs to participate. 
Also the maritime industry. 
About 90% of the world’s transports are done on ships and there are no alternative solution. However, shipping 
has a much lower carbon footprint per ton-mile than trucks and airplanes. In a future with a continued growing 
economy the transportation need will increase many times over to 2050. At the same time, the emissions must be 
decreased. There are presently no alternative to fossil fuel for ships (leaving wind and nuclear aside). However, by 
slowing a typical container vessel down from 14 knots to 11 knots, the fuel consumption is more than halved 
(Stopford, 2009). This is called “slow steaming”. But if ship go slower, more ships must be added to the transportation 
system to make up for the lost capacity. A study by Pierre Cariou (2011) shows that slow steaming anyhow has the 
potential of reducing emissions by around 11%. This is close to the target of a 15% reduction by 2018 that was 
proposed by the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee, 2009. The total greenhouse gas emissions from 
the global maritime transport industry (2.2% of the world’s total) are estimated to have been cut by 20% from 2007 
to 2012, the International Chamber of Shipping stated recently (2015) and aims at reducing emissions by 50% to 2050. 
Some of this can be done by more efficient engines and fuels and some can be done by more efficient traffic 
management. Route exchange, as described above, can contribute by reducing speed through just-in-time-arrival 
without reducing the capacity of the maritime transport systems. However, to be really effective, speeds needs to be 
reduced to what is called “super-slow speeds” (10–12 knots, or lower). In these speeds, energy efficiency is optimized. 
For the transport system, this means more and bigger ships, but also drastically longer voyages. 
In 2014, a consultant at a major shipping company revealed his listing of the three, in his opinion, biggest threats 
for the company in the coming five to fifteen years. As number one came “the unattractive industry”. His doubt was 
whether the shipping industry would be able to attract the millennium generation born between the early 80s and the 
early 00s (Wichmann, 2014). In a report to the IMO in 2010 the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 
and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) reported that “our results indicate that the industry will most probably 
face a tightening labour market, with recurrent shortages for officers, particularly as shipping markets recover” (Lang, 
2010). The international shipping industry will require an additional 42,500 officers by the end of 2019 to cope with 
the expected growth in the main cargo carrying fleet, according to the latest Manning report published by global 
shipping consultancy Drewry (gCaptain, 2015). It could be that unmanned ships will be necessary to keep up the 
transport capacity. 
The MUNIN project investigated the feasibility of unmanned, autonomous merchant vessels. The ships will be 
manned while departing and entering port and unmanned during ocean-passage. When unmanned, the ships will be 
controlled by an automatic system informed by onboard sensors allowing the ship to make standard collision 
avoidance manoeuvres according to international regulation. The ship will be continuously monitored by a remote 
shore centre able to take remote control should the automatic systems falter. Technical and legal problems are 
envisioned to be solvable. Human error remains, but is shifted to the programmer and maintenance level as well as 
the remote control centres. For the humans in the shore centres the usual problems of automations remains as well as 
a pronounced problem of keeping up adequate situation awareness through remote sensing. The big challenge for 
a future autonomous technology will be to show that an unmanned system is at least as safe as a manned ship system, 
and to provide the shore control operators with adequate situation awareness (Porathe, Prison, Man, 2014) 
For details of the MUNIN findings, please see the reports on the project web site.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has summarized some results from five different EU projects 2009–2015. The results all points to 
possible improvements in safety and efficiency of future ship traffic. The projects have made it possible to build 
prototype applications and test them on mariners to assess “professional acceptance”. The results has been 
disseminated though committee work and conferences and thus been forwarded to the international legislation process 
in the IMO through organizations such as e.g. IALA’s e-Navigation committee. Tangible outcomes are already visible, 
e.g. in June 2015 the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee approved the “Guideline on Software Quality Assurance and 
Human-Centred Design for e-navigation”, a product of the Human Centered design work conducted in the 
EfficienSea, MONALISA and ACCSEAS projects. 
It remains to be seen how the proposed ship traffic management and other e-Navigation inventions will be received 
and incorporated into future shipping, but it is the authors firm belief that the EU funded research projects mentioned 
has promoted international European cooperation in a very valuable way that hopefully in the future will pay off in 
terms of safety and efficiency. 
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